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This paper attempts to analyse the financial structure
reform of the PRC since 1980. A circular of the State Council,
"Introduction of a Financial Management System by Which the
Scope of Revenues and Expenditures Will Be Defined for Central
and Local Governments Respectively and Whereby Each Will Be
Responsible for the Balance of Its Own Budget", promulgated on
1 February 1980 marked the beginning of a new system. It is
commonly known as a system of "eating at separate kitchens"
分 知 吃 饭 It is to replace the old financial system of
"eating out of the same big pot" 吃 达 锅 饭 which is an
extreme manifestation of egalitarianism.
The purpose of the paper serves to shed some light on the
changed fiscal relationship between the central and local
authorities. Special attention is devoted to the implications
of the current financial reforms.
The current financial reforms render more power to the
local governments at the expense of the central government.
The reduced economic power of the centre prevents it from
controlling a tendency of territoriality or departmentalism.
Given the unprecedented control over financial resources, local
government is no longer just a "pawn" on a chessboard. It is
strong enough to say no to the "advice" of the centre. The
essence of the "whole-country-a-single-chessboard" principle-
the interests of the parts should be subject to the whole- is
fading away.
The current system is a system of "to him that hath, shall
be given". It will lead to inter-local polarization of income.
Some regions will have "to get rich first". A "cellular
pattern" of development prevails in the Chinese economy in
which the "have" regions are relunctant to subsidize the "have-
not" regions.
The study of the, reform programmes reflects the
incremental approach of the PRC policy makers. Their attitude
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1INTRODUCTION
The PRC's budget policy has long been to avoid deficit
financing. Balancing revenue and expenditure with a slight
surplus is her principle of budget planning. However,
throughout her history, she suffered financial deficits quite
often as seen in Table 1.1
In retrospect, the guiding principle of the PRC's
financial management system has oscillated from centralization
to decentralization.2 Since 1980, the latter seems to have won
an upper hand. One of its objectives is to crack the big pot
and do away with the system of eating out of the same big pot
which is blamed for a number of economic crises.
This paper attempts to analyze the recent financial
reforms of eating at separate kitchens
February 1980. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light
on the changed financial relationship between the central and
local authorities by analysing the implications of the recent
financial reforms. The main body of the paper is divided into
five chapters.
Chapter one discusses the historical development of
financial reforms. Over the past three and a half decades,
there had been quite a number of adjustments imposed on the
fiscal system. It is found that the current financial reform
bears a great similarity to those of the past.3 This chapter
provides a quick review of the past financial reforms and
lessons drawn from past experiences. The study of the past
reforms helps to understand better the current reforms.
since
( 吃 大 鍋 飯 )
( 分 紅 吃 飯 )
2Chapter two analyses the current financial reforms in
terms of orientation, scope and content. The basic principles
of the current reforms are also discussed. Since the profit of
enterprises represents the largest source of revenue, financial
decentralization to enterprise level constitutes a core part in
the current financial system. The policy making process of
expanding enterprise autonomy in financial arena is also
examined.
Chapter three discusses in detail the pilot programmes of
the current reforms. The study of the pilot programmes is
significant in itself because the policy making process is
reactive to the feedbacks of these experiments. Special
stresses will be on the substitution of taxation for profit
remittance
far-reaching.
Chapter four analyses the unintended consequences of the
reforms. A tendency of departmentalism brings another set of
problems. The 1982-83 overinvestment crisis is used to
illustrate the inability of the centre to control resources
allocation. The central government's fight against
overinvestment shows that the centre put national interest on
top of local interests.4
Implications of the reforms on the relationship between
the centre and the local authorities are discussed in the
conclusion. A tendency of departmentalism reflects a cellular
pattern of development in Chinese economy in which the
efficient cells are relunctant to subsidize the inefficient
ones.5 Each locality is no longer a pawn on a chessboard as
( 以 稅 反 利 ) The impact of its implementation is
3the local financial power is expanded at the expense of the
centre. By studying the formulation of the recent financial
policies, it is justified to say that the PRC policy-makers
employ an incremental approach to policy making6 and there is a
movement towards the strategic model of policy making.7
4CHAPTER ONE
Historical Development of Financial Reforms
On 1 February 1980 the State Council issued a Circular on
the Introduction of a Financial Management System by Which the
Scope of Revenues and Expenditures Will Be Defined for Central
and Local Governments Respectively and Whereby Each Will be
Responsible for the Balance of Its Own Budgets.(The Circular) I
This introduction is multi-purpose as stipulated in the
Circular: to carry out the policy of readjustment,
restructuring, consolidation and improvement of the economy
to bring the initiative of both the central and local
governments into full play and to meet the need of gradually
realizing the modernization programmes.2 Together with this
Circular a copy of Provisional Regulations Concerning the
Introduction of Financial Management System by Which the Scope
of Revenues and Expenditures Will Be Defined for Central and
Local Governments Respectively and Whereby Each Will be
Responsible for Balancing Its Own Budget3 was enclosed.
It is found that the current reforms bear, to a great
extent, similarities to past financial reforms. In order to
provide a clearer picture, this chapter describes the
historical development of the past reforms.
BACKGROUND
Throughout her history, the PRC financial policy
oscillates from centralization to decentralization. Such a
5"merry-go-round 4 indicates the crucial problem in the PRC's
overall management system: Overcentralization kills initiative.
Initiative overkilled raises outcries for decentralization,
which, in return, causes disorder. And disorder brings
centralization back to where it begins.5
The key to this problem, as advocated by Xue Muqiao, is to
integrate regulation by planning with regulation through the
market.6 His view is widely shared by his contemporaries. Liu
Kuoguang expresses the same view by arguing that the merry-go-
round situation is caused by the failure to employ economic
methods in management system.7 The past reforms on management
focused too much on administrative management instead of
employing economic levers. Following the well-known speech of
Hu Qiaomu on Observe Economic Laws, Speed up the Four
Modernizations in the middle of 1978, a lot of discussions
have been centred on abandoning administrative planning in
favour of using economic levers to manage the economy.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH PAST FISCAL SYSTEM
The fiscal system under a command economy, which had
undergone many changes since its establishment, was one of
unified collection of revenues and coverage of expenditures
The state budget is composed of a central budget
and local budgets. The budgets at different levels reflect how
much revenue has been. collected and the amount spent by
governments at different levels. In other words, judging from
budgets, one can identify the scope of their financial
統 入 統 支
6activities and, more important, the functions and power in
relation to financial matters.
By studying the central budget and local budgets, we are
able to compare the scope of financial activities, functions
and powers of the central government to those of the local
governments. The comparison itself sheds light on the
financial relationship between the centre and locality. The
delineation of financial responsibility between the central and
local governments, stipulated in the Provisional Regulations
Concerning the Introduction of a Financial Management System by
Which the Scope of Revenues and Expenditures Will be Defined
for Central and Local Governments Respectively and Whereby Each
Will Be Responsible for Balancing Its Own Budget, marked
another new phase in the fiscal system. It is a break-away
from the past unified collection of revenues and coverage of
expenditures. Such a change is significant in itself. It
reflects the fact that the PRC leaders are skeptical about the
efficiency of a command economy. A series of reforms
enunciated since December 1978 is hoped to correct any negative
impact resulting from a command economy.
By allowing the local governments to have more say in
local financial activities hints at a movement of a tendency
towards the preference-guided or volition-guided society from
an intellectually guided society.8 The former society is
guided by the preference of the people not by omnipotent
intellectual elites. According to Lindblom, in the context of
allocation of resources, the leaders of intellectually guided
society would opt for universal economic planning however,
7leaders of the preference-guided or volition-guided society
would let market mechanism do the job. Of course, no country
in the world will belong to only either one of these two ideal
types of society. It is very often a matter of degree. The
recent demarcation of financial responsibility between the
central and local governments enunciated in the Circular of
February 1980 does give some hint that the PRC is moving from
one of intellectually-guided society to a society guided by
preferences or volitions of the people.
However, what are the preferences or volitions of the
people? There is no proper or sufficient channel to articulate
people's preferences or reflect their volitions. In view of
the backwardness of the country, the PRC leaders assume that
the improvement of living standard is what the people need. To
a very great extent, this assumption is valid. Tangible
material enhancement is one of human's basic needs. It seems
to please everybody. The whole package of reforms is directed
towards increasing productivity in order to modernize the
country in material terms. The very financial reform is one of
them. It is hoped to break-away from the unitary nature of the
past fiscal system in which revenue bears no relation to
expenditure.
The principle of unified leadership and management at
different levels
the PRC's financial system. In the past, under the principle
of unified leadership, the local governments had to turn all
their revenue over to the centre. In return, the centre
granted them funds to cover their expenditures. Such unified
統 一 領 導 分 級 管 理 has long been a tenet in
8receipts and expenditures system put all the financial power
in the hand of the central government. With the financial
power, the centre could direct all financial activities as it
thought proper. It ensured the completion of national projects
and took care of those poor and less-developed regions. This
system guarantees that everyone has a share of the big pot
which is an extreme manifestation of egalitarianism. The
principle of egalitarianism is something the Communist Party of
China holds dearly. However, the negative impact of such a
system is far-reaching.
Eating out of the same big pot system does not tie
rights with responsibility. The local governments have no
incentive to create revenue because under unified receipts and
expenditures all revenues have to be handed in. Besides,
there is no incentive to minimize costs because full funds are
granted by the centre. Consequently, huge wastages,
ineffectiveness, extravagances are common phenomena. In view
of the situation, Minister of Finance, Wang Bingqian, called
for a combination of responsibility and rights. He demanded,
We must improve and perfect the basic systems in
finance, taxation and financial affairs of the
enterprises to do away with the practice of eating out
of the big pot and institute'as soon as possible a
management system of economic responsibility that
combines responsibility and economic benefit to bring
into full play the enthusiasm of the localities,
departments, units, staff, and workers. 9
The delineation of the jurisdiction and scope of revenues
and expenditures of the centre and local governments provides
an impetus to economic growth. The local governments are
mobilized to generate more revenues. They are assured of
9stable revenues in which they can count on to realize local
development projects. It also frees the centre from balancing
the local budgets. It changes the situation in which a
thousand households claim funds but only one household tries to
make ends meet.
PAST EXPERIENCES IN FINANCIAL REFORMS
For the past three and a half decades, there had been
quite a number of adjustments of the fiscal system. These
adjustments were meant to resolve the dilemma of
centralization-decentralization. It was hoped that an optimum
point could be found in which enough power was decentralized to
local governments to stimulate local growth, but still
permitted the centre necessary control over national economic
growth. This optimum point was by no means easy to achieve.
Very often, when the leaders opted for a centralized fiscal
system hoping to mobilize resources more efficiently and to
distribute public goods more equitably, they unintentionally
stifled local initiative.
Lee demostrates in his article, Enterprises Autonomy
Policy in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Policy-Making, 1978-
83, that the PRC policy makers adopted an incremental
approach to policy making which was closely bound to policy
precedents and was guided by feedbacks of each phase.11 He
also showed that the current reforms were actually the
repetitions of programmes. originally advocated in the 1950s and
early 1960s. It reflects the eagerness of the PRC leaders to
avoid uncertainty. In order to have a clearer picture of the
千 家 花 錢 一 家 平 衡 10
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current financial reforms, it would be necessary to take a
brief review of the past reform programmes of the early days.
The 1950s fiscal reform programmes were discussed
extensively in Lardy's Economic Growth and Distribution in
China.12 The dilemma of centralization-decentralization was
analysed in great detail. It is argued that the adoption of a
highly centralized system of economic planning in the early
1950s was not only a consequence of strong Soviet influence,
but also a demand to use centralized means to revitalize the
economy. The analysis focuses on the leadership's attempt to
improve economic efficiency by decentralizing economic
management without causing economic inequality among different
regions.
As mentioned above, the Chinese national budget is one of
a unified budget which means that it is a consolidated budget
including the revenues and expenditures of all levels. The
nature of the PRC budget is redistributive. The purpose to
include the local budgets in her national budget is two-fold:
(1) limit the scope of extra-budgetary expenditure (2) the
centre's capability to control local revenues and expenditures.
Under such a unified fiscal system, revenue and expenditure
bear no direct linkage. To strive for a balanced budget is
solely the job of the centre.
To mitigate the burden of the centre, the first
decentralization of the fiscal system took place in 1951. A
policy of centralized leadership and multi-level
responsibility was introduced. The principle of revenue
sharing provided incentives for local governments to collect
11
revenue on behalf of the central government. Local governments
were allowed to retain some of the revenue collected for local
economic activities. In addition, budgetary reserves were set
up to meet unanticipated expenditures. These measures marked
an improvement from the previous system. However, local
governments were not quite satisfied. They hoped to use the
surpluses at their own disposal instead of remitting to the
centre at the end of every year. Such policy provoked the
year-end fiscal extravagance. They had no incentive to keep
the operation cost at a minimum level.
In 1954, the scope of revenue-sharing between the central
and local governments was enlarged. The degree of
decentralization in financial arena was greater than that of
1951. For instance, local governments were allowed to retain
surpluses for use in the following fiscal year. However, they
could not use these surpluses at their disposal. Surpluses had
to be used to finance uncompleted projects or assigned as part
of budgetary reserves. Under these circumstances, the central
and local governments did not get on too well. The highly
centralized system was a source of central-local conflict.
In view of the situation, a new system was introduced in
1956. It was a system of control of budgetary totals. The
central government only arranged the revenue total and
expenditure total. The local governments were given the rights
to draw their own expenditure plans. Any positive balance in
the local budget was put under the jurisdiction of the local
governments. However, the local budgets had to be approved by
the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the central government
12
departments sent down financial control targets to local
departments and the local governments found these targets
obligatory.
The 1958 decentralization expanded the system of revenue-
sharing. Instead of being adjusted annually, the rates of
revenue-sharing were fixed over a five-year period. It
lessened the central-local conflict because the local
governments would no longer have to bargain with the centre.for
annual increases. The profits of central government
enterprises were included in the revenue-sharing base for the
first time. Many enterprises directly under the centre were
transferred to the local. It followed that the local
governments were given more discretion over increasing local
revenues. Furthermore, the use of surpluses was left to the
local governments themselves without interference from the
centre. Besides, sources of extra-budgetary income also
increased. The use of extra-budgetary income is completely out
of the control of the centre. Even though it was said that the
1958 decentralization marked the end of centralization, Lardy
argued that the centre still managed to control the overall
level of expenditures of local governments.13 However, after
1962, many restrictions were imposed on the local power to keep
surpluses. These restrictions lasted till 1971. Xu and Chen
summarize the financial situation prior to 1977.14
Before 1977, the general trend was to greatly increase
local financial power. This was shown in the following
figures: in 1957, the last year of the First Five Year
Plan period, the revenues obtained by the central
government accounted for 73.3 per cent of the total
budgeted state revenue while those obtained by the
local governments amounted to 26.7 per cent. By 1971,
13
the former had dropped to 16 per cent and the latter
had risen to 84 per cent. In 1976, the former further
fell to 12.7 per cent and the latter rose again to 87.3
per cent. In 1957, the expenditures handled by the
central government amounted for 71.8 per cent of the
total budgeted state expenditure while those dealt with
by local governments amounted for 28.2 per cent. By
1971, the former had dropped to 59.5 per cent and the
latter had risen to 40.5 per cent. In 1976, the former
dropped again to 46.8 per cent and the latter rose
again to 53.2 per cent. It was obvious that both the
depth and breadth of local financial activies had been
considerably expanded.
Above is a brief review of adjustments of the past fiscal
system. These adjustments came as responses to the crises and
problems confronting the unitary fiscal system.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST EXPERIENCES
The above adjustments of the past fiscal system were
responses to the unintended consequences caused by
overconcentration and the practice of extreme egalitarianism.
These adjustments were in a form of decentralization hoping to
overcome problems resulting from these two drawbacks
(overconcentration and extreme egalitarianism) of the system.
However, it is found that all the adjustments did not live up
to expectation. It is because adjustments in a form of
decentralization created new problems which, in turn, called
for centralized measures to mitigate the situation. As a
result, the cycle of centralization-decentralization keeps
repeating itself.
We often talk about contradiction between vertical and
horizontal lines of division. Vertical lines
to the situation when power is centralized. The management
条 条 refer
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system runs from top to bottom under the central ministries.
The early years of 1950s witnessed the influence of vertical
lines when financial power was held in the centre.
Enterprises were under direct supervision of the relevant
ministries or departments in the central government. The line
of command administration is long. Certainly, centralization
of financial resources helps to promote national economic
growth, ensure key projects and guarantee even distribution of
income more efficiently. Under the system of vertical lines
the ministries of the central government set the expenditure
quotas and pass them down vertically to the local departments.
These quotas are taken as obligatory. It is often said that
money set aside for soy sauce cannot be used to buy vinegar.
Its negative impact on local initiative is salient.
Many adjustments to the past fiscal system aimed at
shortening these vertical lines. For instance, the fiscal
system reform of 1956, mentioned above, only set an overall
quota for the local governments. There is no such thing as
money set aside for soy sauce cannot be used to buy vinegar.
The financial power is decentralized to the horizontal lines
which refer to a province, a city or a county. The
horizontal lines very easily develop into small independent
kingdoms which challenge the authority of the centre. In
order to put an end to such semi-anarchic state, the centre has
to resort to centralized measures. The cycle of centralization-
decentralization keeps on. going.
The fiscal reforms in the past are meant to set a balance
between vertical lines and horizontal lines. In other
（ 块 块 ）
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words, they are meant to adjust the relationship between the
centre and the localities. The relationship between the centre
and the localities has long been a problem in the PRC. Mao
Tsetung summarized the problem in his well-known speech, On
the Ten Great Relationships. In describing the relationship
between the centre and the local governments, he said,
The relationship between the centre and the localities
is.... a contradiction. In order to resolve this
contradiction, what we now need to consider is how to
arouse the enthusiasm of the localities by allowing
them toun more projects under the unified plan of the
centre. 15
He strongly advocated a further extension of local power,
There must be proper enthusiasm and proper
independence. Naturally we must at the same time tell
the comrades at the lower levels that they should not
act wildly, that they must conform, they ought to
conform. Where they cannot conform... then conformity
should not be sought at all costs. Two enthusiasms are
much better than just one.... In short, the
localities should have an appropriate degree of power.
This would be be1eficial to the building of a strong
socialist state.
In the years of 1958, from 1971 to 1973 and from 1980
onwards, it is found that more authority is delegated to the
local governments. The influence of the centre on the local
affairs was reduced. However, all these centralization and
decentralization measures represent the transfer of power from
the local to the centre or vice versa. The results are not
satisfactory. It fails to arouse the local initiative in
generating more revenues or cutting down operation costs.
Economic life remains inactive.
Taking the past experiences into consideration, it is
justified to say that more division of labor between the centre
16
and the local governments within the administrative setup does
not contribute to the national economy. It is a common
phenomenon that once centralized, rigidity sets in once
decentralized, chaos ensues
that the basic way to break through such a vicious circle is to
give the enterprises power to make their own decisions.17 Wang,
among others, emphasizes that neither a further centralization
nor a further decentralization can provide the key to a reform
of the economic setup.18
The current financial system reform stipulated in the
Circular of 1 February 1980 attempts to define the functions
and powers of the central and local governments. The system of
eating at separate kitchens embodies the notion of linking
rights with responsibility. Under this system the power of
enterprises is expanded accordingly.19
The next chapter will take a close look at the programmes
of the current financial reforms. Particular attention will be
devoted to orientation, scope and content.
一 收 就 死 一 放 就 乱 It is argued
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CHAPTER TWO
The Current Financial Reforms
The relationship between the centre and the Localities has
not been properly defined even though Mao Tsetung clearly
spelled out such problem in 1956 and again in 1960. In his
speech to the Politburo on 25 April 1956, On the Ten Great
Relationships, he strongly advocated giving more power to the
localities in order to arouse their enthusiasm. He also
criticized the centre putting too many hands in local affairs.
Again in early 1960 when he commented on the Soviet Textbook of
Political Economy, he raised the same subject. He stated,
Over a long period of time, the country has kept a more
or less unified appearance. One of the defects of this
was bureaucratism, which kept the country under very
tight control, so that each locality could not develop
independently. Procrastination was rampant and
economic development was at a very slow pace.... We
want to attain unification for the whole country and
independence for the different provinces. It will be
relative unification and relative independence.1
As years passed by, this problem remained. In December
1978, it was stated in the third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party:
One of the serious shortcomings in the structure of
economic management in our country is the
overconcentration of authority, and it is necessary to
boldly shift it under guidance from the leadership to
lower levels so that the local authorities and
industrial and agricultural enterprises will have
greater power of decision in management under the
guidance of unified state planning.
Overconcentration of authority in the hand of the centre
18
was identified as one of the major drawbacks in the structure
of economic management. As a result, a package of reforms is
launched hoping to put things right. In the financial arena,
power is decentralized from the centre to the localities.
Financial decentralization measures were made known on 1
February 1980 in the Circular. Provisional regulations were
also transmitted to different localities.
This chapter studies the current financial reforms giving
particular attention to their orientation. scone and r.nntent_
ORIENTATION
The current package of financial reforms is multi-purpose:
to carry out the policy of readjustment, restructuring,
consolidation and improvement
the initiative of both the central and the local governments
into full play and to meet the need of gradually realizing the
modernization programmes.3
The current reform is applicable to provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions. Under this reform the
scope of revenues and expenditures will be defined for central
and local governments respectively. Each locality has to
balance its own budget. A clear division of the revenues and
expenditures between the centre and the locality is the
prerequisite of defining their functions and jurisdiction.
Each locality has specific functions and responsibilities. The
centre is no longer the sole agent to balance the budget. Each
locality has to make both ends meet. It marks a break-away
from the past system of eating out of the same big pot in
调 整 改 革 整 顿 提 高 to bring
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which a thousand households claim funds but only one household
tries to make ends meet. The current system is mostly known as
eating at separate kitchens in which receipts are separate
from expenditures, and local governments assume their financial
responsibility.
In addition, this reform provides a linkage between
revenue and expenditure. As seen above, there is no linkage
between revenues and expenditures when all revenues of the
local governments are remitted to the centre and, in return,
expenditures are funded by the centre. There is no
relationship between revenue and expenditure when financial
power is highly centralized.
The present reform allows the local governments to retain
the whole of the revenue above the quota and use the money at
their disposal. It arouses the local initiative to regulate
expenditures in order to retain a larger surplus. There comes
a direct relationship between revenue and expenditure.
In other words, the current reforms aim at tying rights
with responsibility. Localities are granted more freedom over
local financial affairs. They cannot rely on the centre to
balance their budgets. It is their responsibility to achieve a
balanced budget themselves. They have to trim expenditures by
closing down enterprises that suffer heavy losses.
Besides, by allowing the localities to balance their own
budgets, it is hoped that they would share the financial
responsibility with the centre. The centre has long been the
only one household to make ends meet. Though a slight surplus
is the guiding principle of the PRC budgetary policy, deficit
20
budgets are not uncommon.4
The biggest deficit occurred in 1979. The amount of
deficit reached 17.06 billion yuan. In that year, the state
revenue was 110.33 billion yuan and state expenditure totalled
127.39 billion yuan. To make up the difference, an overdraft
of 9.02 billion yuan was drawn from the People's Bank of China
and 8.04 billion yuan was taken from the past accumulated
surplus. In 1980, the deficit amounted, though reduced, to
12.75 billion yuan. By allowing the local governments to take
a more active role in local financial activities it is hoped to
lessen the burden of the centre. It is also expected that for
their own benefits, the local governments will open up more
financial channels which, in return, will contribute to the
national economy as a whole.
SCOPE AND CONTENT
One feature of the current reforms stipulated in the
Circular of 1 February 1980 is to define the scope of revenues
and expenditures between the central and local governments. As
made known in the appendix of the Circular,5 the revenues for
the centre include:
(a) revenues from the enterprises directly under the
central government
(b) custom duties
(c) regular sources of revenue belonging to the
Ministry of Finance and
(d) industrial and commercial taxes.
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The local revenues include:
(a) revenues from the enterprises directly under local
administration
(b) salt tax
(c) agricultural and animal breeding taxes
(d) industrial and commercial taxes
(e) local taxes and
(f) regular sources of revenue belonging to the
local financial departments.
In addition, 20 per cent of the revenue of those local
enterprises which have been placed under the direct
administration of the central ministries is classified as local
revenue. The remaining 80 per cent of the revenue goes to the
Ministry of Finance. The ratio is fixed. However, the ratio
of the industrial and commercial taxes is not fixed. The
nature of the industrial and commercial taxes is
redistributive. It is used to cover difference arising from
excessive expenditure of any locality.
The expenditures are also divided between the central and
local governments.
The expenditures of the centre include:
(a) the capital investment undertaken by the central
government
(b) the circulating funds of the enterprises under
central administration
(c) expenses for the tapping of potential and
technological transformation of enterprises





(g) national reserve of the state
(h) expenses for cultural, educational, scientific and
health projects under the central government
(i) operating expenses for agriculture, forestry,
irrigation and meteorology
(j) operating expenses for the industrial,
communications and commercial departments
(k) relief fees for extraordinary natural disasters
(1) subsidies for campaigns against extraordinary
droughts and floods and
(m) developing funds in support of underdeveloped
regions.
The expenditures of the local governments include:
(a) the capital investment undertaken by the
localities
(b) the* circulating funds of the local enterprises
(c) funds for the tapping of potential and the
technological transformation of enterprises
(d) funds for trial manufacture of new projects
(e) financial aid to rural people's communes
(f) operating expenses for agriculture, forestry,
irrigation, meteorology
(g) operating expenses for industrial, communications
and commercial departments
(h) maintenance fees for the cities
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(i) funds for building anti-air-raid defence work
(j) funds for moving people from the cities into the
countryside
(k) operating expenses for cultural, educational
health and scientific undertakings
(1) social relief funds
(m) pensions for the disabled and for families of the
deceased and
(n) administrative expenses.
Autonomous regions will follow the system of financial
management that has been promulgated for the nationalities'
autonomous areas. However, the amount of subsidies granted to
these regions will remain unchanged for five years instead of
being reviewed annually. Within the five years, any increased
income will be retained for local use. Moreover, the amount of
subsidies will increase at a rate of 10 per cent each year.
Another feature of the current reforms is that local
governments are responsible for balancing their own budgets.
Local revenues and expenditures are classified as described
above. The classification serves as the base figure, which
determines the proportion of revenue each local government has
to hand over to the central government. After the proportion
and base figures have been fixed, the provinces are responsible
for balancing their budgets. As stipulated in the Circular, a
province, municipality or autonomous region may adopt the same
system to counties and cities under its administration.
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INITIAL STRONG AND WEAK POINTS
After one-year of implementation, it was reported that the
current reform has the following advantages. First, under the
new system, local government can regulate their spending
according to revenue collected. It is not necessary for them
to ask money from their financial department when it is needed.
They begin to take an active role in financial activities.
Their responsibility to balance the budgets make them think
twice before spending.
Second, the past expenditure arrangement from top to
bottom was often out of touch with specific-local conditions.
When the local governments take the same matter in their hand,
local development responds more to local needs.
Third, in order to practise economy, those enterprises
whose goods were not marketable, of poor quality or inefficient
were closed down. Resources saved are directed to other lines
of business.
Fourth, the burden of financial difficulty is shared
between the centre and the local governments. It lessens the
burden of the centre.
However, the current reform has problems in itself. The
most serious one is the unintended consequence of
departmentalism or territoriality.
A tenet that the whole country is a single chessboard is
impossible to uphold. The whole-country-a-single-chessboard
principle requires the interests of the parts subject to the
whole and the interests of each locality subject to the
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interests of the centre. Under the current system, each
locality devotes most, if not all, attention to local affairs.
A tendency of departmentalism or territoriality develops. It
creates a number of other problems. These problems will. be
dealt with in great detail in chapter four below. It causes
changes in the relationship between the centre and the local
governments. Each locality is no longer a pawn in a
chessboard.
However, not all local governments favour such reform.
The economic underdeveloped regions do not support the reform
because they cannot benefit from it. They have to depend on
the centre to have their budgets balanced. Generally speaking,
the less developed regions prefer unified management and
unified allocation of resources by the central government
whereas the developed areas favour greater independence.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRENT REFORMS
The foregoing chapter described the past financial reforms
and analysed the lessons drawn from them. This section
discusses the basic principles of the current reforms. The
guiding principle of the current reforms is that they must
contribute to the realization of the Four Modernizations. Xing
summarizes the basic principles in his article, The major
reforms of financial system beginning in 1980 Part I7 as
follows:
First, it must be contributive to arousing the initiative
and creativity of the centre, locality, enterprises and
individual.
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oecona, it must guarantee a steady revenue for the centre.
Third, under the unified leadership of the centre, the
financial power of the local governments must be expanded.
Moreover, the financial management power of the enterprise must
be expanded likewise.
Fourth, it must observe economic laws and use economic
levers to speed up economic developments.
Fifth, it must define clearly the scope of power and
responsibility for all levels in order to tie power and
responsibility together.
Following these basic principles, the Circular of the
State Council promulgated on 1 February 1980 defined the scope
of revenues and expenditures of the central and local
governments respectively. It ensures a steady revenue of the
centre. By permitting the local governments to balance their
budgets ties power and responsibilities together. As a result,
localities are more independent in financial matters. Their
financial power is enlarged consequently. The expansion of
financial management power of the enterprises represents the
decentralization of financial power from the centre to
enterprise level. It changes the relationship between the
state and enterprises. Lee argues that though the change of
relationship between the state and enterprises was largely
incremental and was closely bound to policy precedents, there
is something innovative within the enterprise autonomy policy.
It is the substitution of taxation for profit remittance
begun in October 1984.8
The next chapter will go into details of this policy and
以 税 代 利
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analyse its significance in the light of the changed
relationship between the centre and local authorities.
EXPANDING ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY
Enterprise autonomy policy is not something innovative.
Lee argues that the current reform programmes originated during
1958 to 1961 and were repeated in the six years from 1978 to
1983.9 He identifies four sets of policy papers produced during
the 1950s and 1960s which are directly relevant to the current
reform prior to 1984.10 Nor is the policy to allow local
governments to retain a predetermined proportion of the
revenues it collects a new policy measure. During periods of
decentralization of 1958 and 1970, the centre permitted
localities to retain a fixed proportion of the revenues and to
decide the composition of their expenditures. It is found that
whenever the fiscal authority is decentralized, it is usually
accompanied by parellel delegation of authority to the
enterprises. In other words, the degree of central control
over enterprises varies accordingly with the degree of central
control over local budgets. It is understandable because the
profit of enterprises represents the largest source of revenue
followed by an industrial and commercial tax. Table 2
indicates this fact.
The system of financial management of the enterprises is a
core part of the financial system. It is important because of
its ability to restructure the system of budget control. State
budget is one of the effective instruments of financial control
to regulate the economy. The current reform of financial
28
management in enterprises comes as a response to the over-
concentration of power in the macro-managerial structure.
The financial management of the past has undergone many
changes. During the times of centralization, the profits and
basic depreciation funds of the enterprises were all turned
over to the state, whereas expenditures including operating
expenses and expenses for technical and safety measures,
development of new products and minor capital construction
investments were all sent from the centre. There was no
relation between revenue and expenditure.
During the times of decentralization, especially in the
years of 1958 and 1970 when financial power was decentralized
to enterprise level, a profit-sharing system was practised.
The enterprises were allowed to retain a fixed proportion of
their profits. Money could be used to expand production or to
improve workers' welfare.
However, power was separate from responsibility. The
distribution of the profit and funds was not connected with
economic performance. Before the current reform, the economic
relationship between the state and its enterprises was called
eating out of the same big pot. The decentralization of 1958
attempted to abolish such a system by allowing state
enterprises to retain part of their profit through the profit
retention method but the effort was in vain.
In the early years of 1960s the enterprises were allowed
to set up their own enterprise funds. However, such practice
was stopped during the Cultural Revolution. It was resumed
only in 1978. In July 1979 the State Council gave official
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approval to reform the financial management system of
enterprises. The current financial management reform changes
the relationship between the state and enterprise. Successive
administrative decentralizations were not successful. The
enterprises viewed such reforms as changing their masters.
No matter whether they were under a central bureau or a local
bureau, the enterprises were treated the same. The current
reform realizes such mistake and attempts to deal with it by
economic decentralization. It hopes to change the relationship
of the state and enterprise from administrative to economic.
Greater decision making power becomes the order of the day.
Enterprise autonomy is regarded as the key link in overall
management reform.
Deng Xiaoping's thirty points of 1978 demanding more
central control and more co-ordination among provincial
governments was criticized. His thirty points on industry
was expressed in the Draft Decision Concerning Some Problems
in Speeding Up the Development of Industry which defined
clearly that the five fixes and eight targets should be
followed by the enterprises. (Five fixes: fixing the nature and
scale of production, personnel and organization, consumption
quotas and supply sources, capital assets and liquidity and
links with other enterprises) Hu Qiaomu challenged by saying
that enterprises should be granted more economic responsibility
in order to arouse their enthusiasm. Although limited, it
marked the first step to expand enterprise autonomy. From
October 1978 onwards, a series of pilot programmes were
launched to transfer a greater economic power from the centre
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to enterprise level.
The programmes covered six areas, as identified by
White.11 These six areas are: the right for enterprises to draw
up their own production plans in accordance with the
requirements of both plans and market, to be regulated by
contracts with both the state and customers the right to
market a portion of their own products (after meeting plan
targets) the right to greater financial control over funds for
renewal or expansion of fixed assets, welfare measures and
worker bonuses the right to hire and re-assign labor power and
adjust wage levels and scales the right to arrive at
negotiated prices for their products subject to state
guidelines the right to refuse unreasonable requisitioning of
funds, materials or labor by superior organs.
The next chapter will discuss the pilot programmes of the
current financial reforms giving particular attention to
financial decentralization to enterprise level.
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CHAPTER THREE
Financial Decentralization to Enterprises
Throughout history, the decentralization of financial
power in the PRC has been closely related to control over the
enterprises. Such control includes laying a firm hand on
financial matters and activities of the enterprises. That is
to say, the revenues and expenditures of the enterprises are
included in the budgets of the governments which control them.
If more enterprises are put under the central government, the
latter will have more financial power vis-a-vis the local
governments. The extension of financial power of the local
governments was done simply by transferring enterprises under
central control to local control, as seen in the years of 1958
and 1970. For the past few years, we witness the extension of
financial power of the local government as a result of the
transfer of enterprises from the centre to the local
authorities.
The current reform on the expansion of enterprise autonomy
owes its orign to the reform programmes implemented from 1958
to 1961, as identified by Lee.I He also found that the policy
of enterprise autonomy, in the post-Mao era, was scaled down to
the profit retention system.
The profit retention policy was implemented after the
promulgation of an important document by the State Council in
May 1958: Several State Council Regulations Concerning the
Implementation of the Enterprise Retained Profit System. The
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enterprises were allowed to retain a certain amount of profits
once the targets were achieved. The current retention policy,
quite similar to that of 1958, is a means to get rid of the
system of unified collection of revenue and coverage of
expenditure, which is a fundamental deficiency of a state-
administered economy.
The World Bank Report on the PRC development conducted in
1983 summarizes the profit retention schemes as follows:
In 1978 the Government reinstated an enterprise fund
scheme in which some enterprises fulfilling plan
targets were allowed to retain profits amounting to 5
per cent of their wage bill. Starting in 1979, some
experimental enterprises in industry and transport were
permitted to keep a share of based profits and a larger
share (10- 30 per cent) of incremental profits. The
retention rates varied by industry and even by firm,
depending on overall profitability, and there were
fewer restrictions on the use of these funds. By mid
1980, experimental enterprises numbered about 6,600 and
they accounted for 44 per cent of state industrial
output and 57 per cent of profits. In the past two
years, other schemes have been introduced to permit
partial retention of the value saved when enterprises
reduced losses, retention of a large share of profits
above a target quota, profit sharing controlled by a
bureau (e.g., the Shanghai Textile Bureau) rather than
by individual enterprises, and a scheme in which 460
state-owned enterprises pay taxes rather than sharing
profits By the end of 1981, over 80 per cent of all
state industrial enterprises above the county level
were under some form of responsibility system.
This chapter focuses on the above three types of financial
reforms at enterprise level, namely, profit retention
利 潤 當 成 profit contract 利 潤 包 干 and substitution of
taxation for profit remittance 以 稅 代 利 Special attention




Prior to the scheme of profit retention, a system of
enterprise funds was re-introduced again in November 1978. Any
enterprise which fulfills all the eight annual targets (output,
variety, quality, consumption of raw materials, fuel and power,
labor productivity, costs, profit and use of circulating funds)
may draw an enterprise fund amounting to 5 per cent of its
total annual payroll. If it fails to fulfill the four targets
in output, variety, quality and profit, it is not entitled to
the fund. The fund is mainly used for staff's welfare and
bonuses. Undeniably, with the introduction of enterprise fund,
enterprises have greater financial power. However, such system
is related to the payroll of any enterprise. The more staff an
enterprise has, the greater amount of funds it can claim. It
gives little incentive for enterprises to cut down redundant
personnel.
The trial programme of the profit retention scheme is
incremental. The first pilot programme began in Sichuan
Province in October 1978. Six enterprises were selected for
the purpose. In December 1978, the third Plenum of the CPC
Central-Committee gave support to the expansion of pilot
projects.
Judging from the impressive results from the Sichuan
experiments, the State Council in July 1979 decided to expand
the pilot programmes by issuing five documents on regulations
concerning the implementation of the profit retention system in
state run enterprises.4 These five documents advocated a
nationwide implementation. The chosen enterprises were to test
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the guidelines promulgated in the documents. These guidelines
were:5
(a) retaining a proportion of profits
(b) enjoying expanded authority over labor and current
production decisions, and the right to market
independently output produced outside the state plan
(c) paying fees for fixed capital used
(d) paying interest charges to the bank for all
circulating capital used and
(e) retaining that proportion of depreciation that had
been remitted to the central. government budget, and
gradually increasing depreciation rates as production
grew.
In Sichuan alone, the number of enterprises involved grew
to 100 at the beginning of 1979 and to 417 in 1980. Table 3
compiled by Lockett and Littler indicates clearly the
impressive results of the pilot programmes in Sichuan.6
A National Work Conference on Industry and Communications
held in Nanjing in April 1980 made known that the results of
the 3,300 experimental enterprises had been amazing in terms of
generating profits, enterprise funds and staff income. The
Conference concluded by saying that the direction of expanding
enterprise discretionary power is correct and demanded a
further increase in the number of enterprises participating.
The Report on the Experimental Expansion of Enterprises Self-
management and Opinions, on Future Work in 1981 demanded all
state run enterprises should take part in the trial programmes.
The decision was made based on the impressive results from the
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experimental enterprises.
Similar to that of Sichuan, the industrial output value
from 100 pilot enterprises in Yunnan Province rose by 11.4 per
cent in 1979 over the previous year. They earned 13.2 yuan in
profit for every 100 yuan output value.7 Again, in Zhejiang
Province, 74 enterprises took part in the pilot project. They
represented a 14.2 per cent increase in output value and 21.4
per cent increase in profit handed over to the centre in 1979
as compared with 1978.8
The approach of policy formulation on profit retention
scheme mirrors a basic procedure of the PRC policy making
process, that is, gradual expansion of new policies of results
achieved from trial points (i'). Needless to say, the
approach benefits from the advantages of incrementalism.
However, it creates other problems.
The trial enterprises chosen were those of superior
performance record and the trial results might not be
representative. Besides, the trial enterprises were under
pressure to produce good results because they were closely
watched by others. In other words, the policy makers might be
misled by the impressive results and made unrealistic
decisions.
Additionally, with regard to the content of the reforms
there created another set of problems. It was the intention of
the reformers to enhance the financial independence of the
enterprise hoping to increase the economic initiative. The
setting up of enterprise funds was one of the means. However,
the amount of enterprise funds claimed was based on the
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payroll. It encouraged an enterprise to have a big labor
force. It is unfair to see a badly managed enterprise with a
larger workforce entitled to a bigger enterprise funds than a
well managed enterprise with fewer staff.
Furthermore, the 1978 State Council regulations stipulated
that enterprises could not draw on enterprise funds if they
could not achieve the eight annual plan targets. In order to
be on the safe side, enterprises would under-estimate their
productivity and set low targets.
What is more, even though enterprises were entitled to
enterprise funds, the discretion of the enterprise manager to
use it was limited. The superior bureaus often interferred in
how the funds should be used. Renmin Ribao of 17 January 1979
reported a good case to illustrate this point. It was reported
that the Wuhan Iron and Steel Company had a profit of 60
million yuan over target. According to the regulations, the
Company should have retained 6 million yuan for its enterprise
funds. However, its superior organ, the Hubei Provincial
Metallurgy Bureau used 5 million Yuan of it to balance losses
in other enterprises. The Company, as a result, only retained
1 million yuan. This problem of limited discretion to use
enterprise funds has not been solved.
The Asian Wall Street Journal of 17 April 1986 reported
the meddling attitude of the supervising agencies. The Da Bao
Shan Mining Company officials were quoted to have said that the
Mining Company's supervising agencies had refused to step
aside. Therefore, the centre's policies did not always get
full implementation at the local level. These supervising
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agencies were not happy to see their privileges trimmed. They
took what power they could to frustrate the policy.
Consequently, a tendency of territoriality develops.
In April 1981, the pace of reform began to gather momentum
with the introduction of the economic responsibility system
The profit retention system turned into a new
phase- profit contract system.
PROFIT CONTRACT SYSTEM
The profit retention system of July 1979 did not consider
any difference in retained profits between the fulfilment and
over-fulfilment of annual profit plans. The profit contract
system took the degree of over-fulfilment into consideration.
The rates were proportional to the degree of over-fulfilment,
ranging from 20 to 100 per cent. It was first introduced in
Shandong Province in Spring 1981.
The profit contract system was closely related to the
economic responsibility system which was defined by Sun,
clearly defined responsibility must be borne between
the state and the enterprises, between enterprises
among themselves, between various sectors within the
enterprise and by workers in their productive
activities. In simple terms, there is to be a sound
system of economic responsibilities at all levels and
for each person.
In other words, the enterprises have a contract with the
state to turn in certain amount of profit annually. Any above
quota profits are shared between the enterprise and the state
in fixed proportions.
Enterprises suffering losses were encouraged to reduce
经 济 負 責 制
38
them. They had a contract with the centre receiving a fixed
subsidy to cover the losses. If the loss turned out to be
smaller than the amount fixed in the contract, the enterprise
could keep the balance or share with the centre.
It seems that the profit contract system is more flexible
when compared with the profit retention system. However, the
former took the performance of the preceding year of an
enterprise as the minimum target of the current year. As a
result, the enterprises held back their effort in order to
avoid a higher target next year. There appears a situation in
which the most efficient enterprises were penalized. It is
commonly known as whipping a galloping buffalo
A Report of the State Economic Committee on
Current Pilot Schemes for Expanding Enterprise Autonomy and
Views on the Future of 2 September 1980 admitted the fact.10
Besides, the profit contract system was mainly applicable
to smaller enterprises, most of which were under direct control
of the local governments. With material and financial power in
their hands, the local governments did not need to adhere to
any interference from the centre. The local enterprises were
under the local governments' jurisdiction. The development of
local industries turned out beneficial to locality not to the
nation as a whole. Naughton identified this phenomenon as
tendency toward local protection,11
Certainly, the central planners were not satisfied with
such development especially its negative impact on central
government revenues. Coupled with many other problems,12 the
financial reforms moved to another stage by the end of 1982.
鞭 打 快 牛
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SUBSTITUTION OF TAXATION FOR PROFIT REMITTANCE
Substitution of taxation for profit remittance marked a
first step for enterprises to become financially independent
commodity producers.
Tianjin Watch Factory was selected as one of the trial
points.13 Before the reform, the factory had to hand over all
its profit to the state. When it was short of working funds,
it asked its supervising organ, Tianjin Clock and Watch
Factory. The process took quite some time and delayed business
decisions. Besides, government subsidies would cover whatever
losses it incurred. As a result of lack of incentive, economic
performance was very poor.
With the introduction of profit retention system in the
second half of 1978, the factory was encouraged to perform
better. It was reported that between January 1978 and June
1980 the factory made 90,820,000 yuan of profit and it retained
5,360,000 for its own use. Its output increased by 600,000
watches in 1981 when compared with 1978.
In mid 1980, the factory was selected again as a trial
point. This time it was to try the new system- tax for
profit. Between mid 1980 and the end of 1983, the factory
retained over 30,000,000 yuan after-tax income, which was six
times the profit retained from January 1977 to June 1980.
Annual output of watches increased by 1,100,000. The results
were impressive.
The new taxation system was introduced in two stages
throughout the country. During the Fifth Session of the Fifth
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National People's Congress in November 1982 Zhao Ziyang
outlined the two stages. The first would allow the co-
existence of taxation and profit remittance
The second would launch a progressive scale of income tax. He
also urged a further expansion of the system substitution of
taxation for profit remittance
factors used in the production process were charged. This was
something novel as compared with the other profit retention
methods.
A National Conference on the Work of Substituting Profits
for Taxes was convened in March 1983. On 29 March 1983
Minister of Finance said substituting taxes for profits was
superior to other forms of profit retentions and it should be
firmly implemented. On 12 April 1983 the Ministry of Finance
promulgated the Trial Methods for Implementing the
Substitution of Profits for Taxes in State Enterprises (Trial
Methods). The State Council approved it on 27 April and
declared that it should be implemented throughout the country
starting from 1 June 1983.
The articles of the Trial Methods of 12 April demanded
that all large and medium-sized enterprises had to pay income
tax at a rate of 55 per cent of their profits. The remaining
45 per cent of their profits was shared between the state and
the enterprises. The portion remitted to the state was handled
by any of these methods:14
(a) by delivery of profit at an increased rate
(b) by delivery of the profit according to a fixed rate
(c) by payment of regulatory tax and
under which all
稅 利 並 存
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(d) by contracting for a fixed quota of profit.
The last method was only applicable to mining enterprises.
Under this system, the state had a large share of revenue.
It could rest assured that 55 per cent of the profit would be
transmitted to the national treasury.
The second stage began on 1 October 1984 and the role of
taxation became a more effective economic lever. It was
implemented prior to the rationalization of the price structure
as it was originally scheduled. The second stage has the
following characteristics:15
(a) The rate of product tax, which is collected from
factories on any product sold regardless of whether
a profit is yielded, is readjusted.
(b) After paying the product tax, the factories have to
pay an income tax.
(c) Then comes the regulatory tax on what remains of
the profit.
(d) Government subsidies are no longer granted
unconditionally to factories which incur losses.
As compared with the first stage, the second stage has
increased the share of the enterprise at the expense of the
state. Even though the retained profit of the enterprises has
increased, there is still demand on more retained profit. An
article appearing in Beijing Review of 23 December 1985
proposed to amend the tax system: elimination of the regulatory
tax, substitution of the flat tax rate by progressive tax rates
for large and medium-sized enterprises, resetting the fees for
fixed and working capital, and the rates of product tax.
42
Zhao Ziyang pinpointed the importance of the taxation for
profit remittance system at a meeting held in July 1984,
By substituting tax for profit delivery, we aim chiefly
at solving the problem of profit distribution between
the state and enterprises. If no breakthrough is made
in this respect, all other urban economic reforms will
be out of the question. So to replace profit delivery
with tax payment is not only a matter of public
finance, but also a precondition for accelerating the
urban economic reform as a whole.
The next chapter will see the significance of substituting
taxes for profit delivery. Particular attention will be
devoted to the unintended consequences of the changed fiscal




The delineation of the scope and jurisdiction of revenues
and expenditures between the central and local governments at
all levels marked a major step to reform the financial system.
To a great extent, a financial system of eating at separate
kitchens proved to be a more efficient system than that of
eating out of the same big pot. The former improves the
financial system in a number of way which are absent in the
latter.
First, it separates receipts from expenditures. Second,
it allows the local governments to assure financial
responsibility. The two combine to tie rights and
responsibility.
The past system of unified collection of revenue and
coverage of expenditure stifled economic initiative. There was
little incentive to generate more revenues or to cut down
unnecessary expenses. The centre has to balance not only its
budget but also budgets of different localities. With the
introduction of revenue-sharing between the centre and the
local governments in February 1980, the situation in which a
thousand households claim funds but only one household tries to
make ends meet came to an end. The burden of the centre is
much lessened and part of the responsibility falls on the
shoulders of the local governments.
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In addition to the burden of balancing budgets, the burden
of overall planning for local development also shifts to the
local governments. They are provided with more and reliable
financial resources which they can count on for regional
planning. With regard to regional planning, the local
authorities are in a better position than the centre to take
care of their needs. Consequently, local authorities are
motivated in securing more revenues and engaging in more
economic undertakings. It has brought into full play their
initiatives. In order to open up more financial channels and
improve economic results, enterprises with long standing
difficulties are likely to be closed down.1
It was reported that in Shenyang last year the workers
from three money-losing enterprises were warned that if they
could not produce sufficient earnings to pay off their debts,
the factories would be sold off and the workers would be laid
off. Fortunately, two of these enterprises escaped being
closed down as made known in Peking's Economic Daily in March.
However, a manufacturer of explosion-proof equipment would be
forced to declare bankruptcy and hundreds would soon be thrown
out of work.2
The notion that enterprises should be allowed to go
bankrupt is under serious attack especially from the workers.
However, Shenyang's former vice mayor Li Changchun answered
back by pointing out that,
the red ink of perennial money losers has merely been
written off on the government's books. On the surface




To protect their revenue, the local governments have to
resort to such a means. It is reported that the central
government is drafting a law to make the bankruptcy policy
official. A long article appearing in Renmin Ribao under the
title Bankruptcy Revelation on 12 May 1986 told the story of
how three factories in Shenyang strived to escape being closed
down.` It seems that the notion of allowing enterprises to go
bankrupt has a positive impact on arousing the efficiency of
enterprises. The notion to allow enterprises to go bankrupt
turns into a hot debate. The pros and cons of the notion
appear frequently on the recent newspapers and periodicals.5
Under the State Council there are many ministries which
are responsible for all the work from the top to the grass-root
level. Under such a centralized management, administrative
directives are more important than economic levers. In an
administered economy, huge administration fees and staff are
involved. However, the results, very often, have turned out to
be far from desired. Bo Yibo proposed to have the following
changes,
We will give more power to the various localities, and
especially give more decision making power over
management to enterprises.... so this readjustment
should in fact be lessening the management capacity of
the various administrative organs of the central
government.... We will give active consideration to the
possibility of allowing enterprises to apply their
individual advantages so that they may be in a better
competitive position with other enterprises.6
He urged that the function of the ministries should be
gradually decreased. It reflects the intention of the PRC
leaders to abandon administrative directives to manage the
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economy. They recognized the fact that highly centralized
management was not healthy to the economy. Therefore, power is
decentralized hoping to save money and time for the centre.
The centre extracts itself from involving too much in local
affairs.
The substitution of taxes for profits alters the fiscal
relationship between the state and enterprises. The practice
of apportioning revenues is no longer according to the
jurisdictions under which the enterprises operate. Instead, the
apportioning revenues between the central and local authorities
is according to tax sources. Taxes are classified as central
taxes, local taxes, and taxes shared by the central and local
authorities. It reduces a lot of conflict resulting from the
contention for jurisdiction over the enterprises by the
financial departments at all levels.7
The system of substitution of taxes for profits remittance
guarantees a steady source of income for the centre and the
local governments as well. It is expected that enterprises of
any trade must pay taxes to the centre or to the local
government to which they belong. After taxation, it is hoped
that the enterprises would be free from unnecessary
interventions from the departments or local governments. The
long standing problem of conflicting interests caused by the
division of departments and regions will then be solved.8
It is often criticized that the crucial problem in the
present economic setup lies in the incorrect relationship
between the state (including the central and local authorities)
and enterprise. The fact that the economy is being run through
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administrative organs (various ministries, supervising bureaus
and so forth) prevents enterprises from functioning as
independent economic entities. Past experiences indicated that
neither decentralization nor centralization could improve the
economic setup with desirable results. It is argued that the
basic way to solve the problem is not to hover around a
division of power between the central and local authorities but
to give enterprises power to make their own decisions.9
The current financial system has psychological effect on
the key personnel of an enterprise. The director of a factory
was reported to have said,
Since the switch from profits to taxes, the burden has
been on the enterprise, other factory directors as well
as I myself watch constantly the implementation of the
plans. Being a factory head for the last two years has
been a far more exciting and intense matter than in the
last decade or so.
It is always a good thing to get the staff involved in the
business of enterprises. They are aware of the fact that their
performance will link with their benefits. They know they are
given more say than before in running the enterprises.
However, the means of production of the state run
enterprises are still owned by the state. They cannot be sold
or transferred by the enterprise. The state holds the key of
appointment. In sum, the nature of ownership of the state run
enterprises is not affected.
The instituting of the current financial reforms is well-
grounded. However, its. unintended consequences pose another
set of problems which are mainly brought forth by a tendency of
territoriality or departmentalism. Donnithorne's description
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of a cellular economy is of relevance here.11
This chapter focuses on the problems caused by
territoriality or departmentalism as unintended consequences of
the reforms.
NEGATIVE IMPACTS
The current reforms bring a major change in the
distributive relationship between the state and the enterprises
and also between the centre and the various levels of local
authorities.
An inability of the centre to perform the function of
resources distribution is a salient negative impact of the
reform. Its failure to direct national resources distribution
is due to a marked decline of state revenue in terms of
national income. In 1978, state revenue amounted to 37.2 per
cent of the national income. In 1979, it dropped to 31.9 per
cent, 28.3 per cent in 1980, 25.8 per cent in 1981 and 25.5 per
cent in 1982. In absolute terms, the state revenue amounted to
112,110 million yuan in 1978, and fell to 110,330 million yuan
in 1979, 108,520 million yuan in 1980 and 108,950 million yuan
in 1981.12
Zhao Ziyang registered his worry about the weakening
financial power of the state in his Report of the Government
Work delivered on 6 June 1983. His worry is well-grounded. A
decline in the financial power of the centre has a number of
consequences. First, the ability of the centre to redistribute
resources is greatly reduced. In view of a boom of local
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investment, the centre has to cutback its national investment
in order to maintain a marcoeconomic balance. As a result,
national projects arranged in the Five Year Plan have to stop
either due to insufficient capital or resources. The
redistributive function of the centre is thus crippled. Large
scale busineses, for instance, energy and transport, which only
the centre is capable of providing, suffer a great deal.
Second, the state budget suffered a hugh deficit. The
budgetary principle of the PRC is to have a balance budget with
a slight surplus. However, in 1979, the deficit reached 17,060
million yuan. Though it fell to 4,350 million yuan in 1983,
the impact was widely felt. The centre had to trim the
national investment projects in order to bring the deficit
under control. The cutback in projects has brought great
tension in the public facilities sector.
Third, revenues in the hand of the local governments and
enterprises rise at the expense of the centre. The financial
strength of the local government grew in term of extra-
budgetary funds. With more financial resources at hand, they
have a high propensity to invest. Naughton compiled a table
(Table 4) to show a marked increase in local fixed investment
from 1977 to 1982.13 In 1980, local fixed investment amounted
nearly the same amount as the centre, 49 per cent of the total
fixed investment. It grew to 58 per cent in 1981 and 63 per
cent in 1982.
The reason for high incentive to invest in fixed assets is
that the financial liability attached to fixed assests is very
limited. Moreover, the added fixed assets will, no doubt,
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enhance productivity which, in return, will bring in more
profits. Lee compiled a table (Table 5) on the total
investments in fixed assets from 1976 to 1983 to show that the
state budget investment in 1976 amounted to 83 per cent of the
total investment and extra-budgetary investment was only 17 per
cent. However, in 1982, the state budget investment and extra-
budgetary investment reached the same level, being 50 per cent
each.14
1982- 83 OVERINVESTMENT CRISIS
Socialist enterprises are often criticized as not being
subject to serious threat of punishment if investments fail.
The insufficient sanctions for poor investments indirectly
encourage expansion drive. 15
Unrestrained local investments, especially investment in
fixed assets, cause a serious headache to the centre. In his
Report to the Sixth National People's Congress in June 1983,
Yao Yilin reported the critical situation,
The over-extension of capital construction and
excessively decentralized use of the investment funds
meant that some planned projects had to give way to
those outside the plan and key projects to ordinary
ones. Energy and transport projects, in particular,
were adversely affected by6a lack of funds, materials
and construction workers.
The situation was so bad that an Urgent Circular jointly
issued by the State Council and the Central Inspection
Commission of 3 July 1983 criticized that
many regions, enterprises, and undertakings,
disregarding the relevant regulations laid down by the
CCP Central Committee and the State Council and take
advantage of the initiation of a batch of key items,
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wantonly raise the prices of the means of production
apportion irratioil expenses to the capital
construction units.
The Urgent Circular demanded immediate controls on the
prices of construction material and abolition of any local
service surcharges on key construction projects. Special
inspection teams were sent to local areas to see that
instructions in the Urgent Circular were carried out.18 The
centre had to resort to administrative means. These
administrative means include rechecking all projects under
construction, reducing the cost of project construction,
recentralization and so forth. 19
On 12 July Song Ping demanded a rechecking of all projects
especially those outside the plan.20 These stern measures
helped to mitigate the situation. On 30 March 1984 Renmin
Ribao reported that the problem of overinvestment was kept
under control and investment was brought under the state plan
target.21
Hsin holds extra-budgetary investment activity accountable
for the 1982-83 overinvestment crisis.22 He compiled a table
(Table 6) to show the relationship between the state budgetary
vis-a-vis extra-budgetary investment in capital construction.
His findings are:
State budgeted investment in 1981 was 40 per cent lower
than the investment in 1978. By contrast, during the
same period, extra-budgetary investment soared
continually except a slight drop in 1981. Its level
was 122 per cent higher in 1981 than in 1978, compared
with the 40 per cent decre2se in state budgetary




The extra-budgetary investment activity is a result of the
new financial system. Local governments are responsible for
their own budgets and area developments. The accumulated
revenue induced them to realize local development ambitions.
Other factors like low interest rates, enthusiastic bank
lenders, expansion of enterprise autonomy, price distortion and
time lag are accountable for the overinvestment crisis of 1982-
83.24
It is argued that the PRC leaders' fight against the 1982-
83 overinvestment crisis showed that the centre strongly
emphasized the interests of a nation as a whole rather than
local ones.25 However, the fight should not stop there because
the problems resulting from a tendency of territoriality or
departmentalism are getting more serious.
TENDENCY OF TERRITORIALITY OR DEPARTMENTALISM
The whole-country-as-a-single-chessboard principle demands
that the parts should be subject to the whole and the lower
echelon should be subject to the higher echelon.26 In the arena
of planning, the principle stresses the importance of
mobilizing all resources to accomplish national projects for
the benefit of the whole country.27 This principle is still
upheld by the PRC leaders and a tendency of territoriality or
departmentalism is strongly denounced.
Territoriality emphasizes self-interests and it is
contradictory to the principle of the whole country as a
single chessboard. In September 1983 Xue Muqiao warned a
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tendency of departmentalism. He criticized locality's emphasis
on short-sighted interest, blind investment, duplicative
projects, and neglect central planning and policy. 23
Donnithorne's cellular economy description of the PRC
economy since the Cultural Revolution is of relevance to the
present intra-regional development.29
In the arena of resources allocation, she found that local
authorities felt unwilling to supply other areas. She
illustrated this point with two cases. First, when the mayor
of Shanghai asked Chiang Hua, first Secretary of the Chekiang
Party Committee for specified quantities of certain
commodities, Chiang Hua was reported to have replied that
Chekiang is not a colony of Shanghai. Another case took place
in 1962, a year of grave food shortages in many parts of China.
When some neighbouring provinces asked Chekiang for certain
amounts of supplementary food items, Chiang Hua turned down the
request and said, I have pigs to feed. 30 Local governments
are enjoying unprecedented control over resources, therefore,
they are very eager to resist attempts by the centre to take
back that control. 31
Shirk points out that except a few period shifts, it was
the policy of the PRC to disperse industries throughout the
country from 1956 to 1978. Such practice was the manifestation
of egalitarianism. However, the leaders favoured the inland
provinces with a disproportionate share of central capital
investment and fiscal subsidies. The coastal provinces
(Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Guangdong, Tianjin, Beijing, and Shanghai) were treated
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discriminately.32
The current reforms free the coastal provinces from the
discriminate control of the centre. These provinces benefit a
great deal because they have a comparatively good industrial
foundation and communication network. Huge volumes of foreign
investments are concentrated in a few coastal provinces. The
open-door policy greatly enhances the status of these areas.
There are mixed feelings towards the current reforms. Xue
Muqiao comments on these feelings,
In general, the industrially developed areas wish to
acquire greater independence and the underdeveloped
ones prefer unified management and unified allocation
of products by the central government. For these
reasons, it has been very difficult for the state
organs of economic management to reach an agreement on
changing the current system of planning and
management.
The current system is a system of to him that hath, shall be
given. Needless to say it will lead to inter-local
polarization of income. Some regions will have to get rich
first. Regional conflict is manifested in establishing local
blockades. This phenomenon is very similar to that identified
by Donnithorne in a cellular economy. When a local authority
controls the manufacture as well as the distribution of goods
in its area, administrative protection is almost bound to exist
through priority being given to local products. At present, it
seems that local authorities in China often provide a high
degree of administrative protection of this kind to home
producers. 34
When inland provinces came to a more profitable light
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consumer goods market and faced serious competition from
coastal provinces, they would plead for official protection
from the centre. In 1982 Anhui Province objected to an
exhibition of Shanghai products held in their province because
they themselves were producers of many of these products. The
State Economic Commission permitted Shanghai to hold the
exhibition but products identical to those made in Anhui could
not be put on display.
Wong holds the irrational price structure accounted for
the problem of localism and resistance to inter-regional
transfers. Under an irrational price system, there exists an
unequal distribution of profits between producers and
processors of raw material.35 Given the high profit and tax
rates for cigarette manufacture, local officials would fight to
retain more tobacco for local processing. Henan Province was a
case quoted by Xue Muqiao to demonstrate this point.36
A tendency of territoriality is further enhanced by the
increasing interference of commercial departments or
supervising bureaus. It is the policy of the centre to expand
enterprise autonomy. The 1984 regulations delegate more self-
regulating powers to industrial enterprises. However, their
supervising agencies refused to step aside. It is reported
that the supervising agencies in Guangdong Province, not Da Sao
Shan Mining Company, that had the power to set the Company's
output goal, sell its products and hire senior staff.37 The
expansion of enterprise autonomy undercut the power of
government departments. Some of these supervising agencies
took whatever power they could to frustrate the new policy. Da
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Bao Shan Mining Company was under direct intervention from its
supervising agencies. Annual output was fixed by the Guangdong
Province's Planning Commission. Profit and taxes were set by
the Province's Finance Department. Energy supply was
controlled by the Province's Economic Commission. Senior staff
were appointed by the Guangdong Metallurgical Industry
Corporation. Sales were handled by the Guangdong Metallurgical
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Ore corporation.
The system of eating at separate kitchen emphasizes
reliance on local resources. The resources distribution
function of the centre has been undermined. These two factors
combined to enhance a tendency of territoriality. It moves
towards a cellular pattern of development of the economy in
which self sufficeint cells (local areas or enterprises) are
relunctant to subsidize those insufficient ones.39
It seems that the current package of reforms has brought
more problems than it has solved. The next chapter will
conclude the paper by examining the implications of the reforms





The financial relationship between the central and local
authorities has undergone various changes since the
decentralization policy of 1980. These changes bear great
similarity to those changes brought forth by the 1958
decentralization. 1
One of the most salient features of change is the relative
economic power of the central and local authorities. The
inability of the centre to implement an effective national plan
is a consequence of the reduced economic power of the centre.
The inability of the centre to direct resources allocation
prevents it from controlling a tendency of departmentalism.
Liao Chu-li refers departmentalism as putting interests of
one's own unit- province, city, ministry, or any other- above
the interests of all others, the national or collective
interests in particular.2 He argued that some degree of
localism or departmentalism was probably inevitable this was
the cost to be paid for bringing local initiative into full
play.3 This problem was dealt with by strengthening the Party
leadership.4 It was to make sure that the enlarged power of the
local governments would not challenge the centre. To fight
against departmentalism, economic co-operation regions were
formed to secure better co-ordination among different
provinces.
In view of the present tendency of departmentalism, the
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State Council promulgated Regulations Concerning Further
Horizontal Co-operation Problems on 23 March 1986. It aims at
solving problems resulting from regional blockades, localism or
territoriality. Horizontal co-operation becomes a hot topic
ever since. It seems that many favour the idea of horizontal
co-operation, however, there are many problems when put into
practice.5
The administrative decentralization component of the
current reforms encourages lcoal officials to play a more
active role in overseeing the factories under their
jurisdiction. However, profit-hunger promts the local
officials to commit economic crimes (fraudulent accounting,
taxation evasion, smuggling and so forth). Though past
decentralizations and current decentralization both lead to
dispersion of investment, current investment pattern is
different from the past.
The current investment pattern focuses on consumer goods
that yield high and quick return of profits. Electric
household appliances seem to be the most profitable items. The
irrational price system makes these products very inducive to
local investors. It was reported that in Wuhan before 1978,
there was only one factory manufacturing electric fans. By the
end of 1979, the number of factories grew to 23 in Wuhan and
1,500 in the whole country.6
A thirst for profit of the local officials, to a great
extent, is responsible. for the duplicative projects and excess
supply of certain products. The PRC leaders did not sit idle in
this matter. An Urgent Circular jointly issued by the State
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vvUl1l111 diiu Lne central Discipline Inspection Commission in
July 1983 demanded to curb the two trends (construction
overinvestment and excessive new porjects).7
Lack of consistency in the reform package is to blame.
Throughout the implementation process, there is no clear
blueprint. The current reforms are repetitions in slow motion
of programmes originally advocated and implemented in the 1950s
and early 1960s.8 It reflects the incremental approach to
policy making by the PRC policy makers. They are closely bound
to policy precedents. They watch very carefully the feedbacks
from the pilot programmes. The decisions are guided by the
results of these experiments. In order to minimize uncertainty
they narrow down the range of policy experiments. They tend to
postpone policies with unanticipated results. Under these
circumstances, the reforms were initiated in a piecemeal
fashion. Pilot experiments were carried out in carefully
selected areas: Agricultural production responsibility systems
were first tested in Anhui Province and enterprise retention
schemes in Sichuan Province.9
Needless to say, piecemeal approach reduces the
effectiveness of the current reforms. Lack of rational price
system is responsible for giving wrong signal in resources
allocation. Duplicative projects and excess supply are the
outcomes.
The incremental and piecemeal steps taken by the policy
makers reflect their attitude of uncertainty avoidance. Being
sensitive to risk in introducing new policy, they confine
policy options to practical reasons. The second phase of
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substitution of taxation for profit remittance was introduced
earlier than scheduled prior to the rationalization of price
system. It was due to practical considerations. At that time
the centre's finance was in a precarious state. The current
tax for profit system is the most efficient way to guarantee a
reliable source of revenues.
The crisis-response modell° is also applicable to the
policy making process within this period. The policy measures
show that the central policy makers are reactive to crises and
problems. Zhao Ziyang in his Report on the Work of the
Government in 1983 remarked that the most outstanding problem
facing the Government was that state finances were inadequate
and that state funds were seriously dispersed. The Urgent
Circular of July 1983 was to overcome the problem of dispersion
of funds. The second stage of substitution of taxation for
profit remittance aimed at solving the state finances
difficulties. The policy measures were implemented out of
practical reasons.
Lee observes a change in the PRC policy making process.
It is a movement towards the strategic model of policy
making.11 Lindblom describes the strategic model in which
people are not competent to know what is correct, they fall
back on their own volitions, however imperfectly understood, as
a test.12 He generalizes that, in reality, the policy makers
in a socialist country tend to move in this direction. Lee
remarks that though at a normative level of analysis the top
PRC policy makers followed the synoptic Model13, in reality,
14
it moved towards the strategic model.
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The growing economic power of the local governments makes
it more difficult for the central government to direct an
effective national planing. Any attempts to reduce local
control over resources will be met with strong local
resistance. Given the problems discussed above, why do the PRC
leaders not resort to centralization of financial resources?
Naughton suggests two reasons: First, to re-centralize
financial resources would be to destroy the foundation that has
already been laid for a comprehensive economic reform. Second,
the central planners do not have the technical and
informational resources to effectively plan the entire
economy. 15
Given the unprecedented control over financial resources,
local government is no longer just a pawn on a chessboard.
It is strong enough to say no to the advice of the centre.
Though the central government has tried very hard to put the
national interests in a number one position, as seen in its
fight against the 1982-83 overinvestment crisis, each locality
gives first priority to self interests. The have regions are
relunctant to subsidize the have-not regions. A cellular
pattern of development prevails in the Chinese economy in
which the efficient cells are not willing to subsidize the
inefficient ones. The essence of the whole-country-a-single-
chessboard principle- the interests of the part should be
subject to the whole- is fading away. A tendency of
departmentalism becomes the order of the day.
62
TABLE 1
NATIONAL REVENUE AND NATIONAL EXPENDITURE (f100 MILLION)

















SOURCE: The Statistical Year book 1985, The State Statistical
Bureau, Beijing, 1986, p52.
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TABLE 2
BUDGET REVENUES (Y billion)
Year
1957 1965 1977 1979
40.214.4 49.326.4Enterprise Profits/a
40.116.511.3 47.3Industrial and Commercial Tax
2.92.6Agricultural Tax 3.0 3.0
1.8 4.2 10.82.3Other Revenues
31.0 47.3 87.4 110.3
Total
SOURCE: China: Socialist Economic Development Vol. 1,




RESULTS OF ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY EXPERIMENTS IN SICHUAN (1979-1980)
1979 1980
Output Value +14.9% (+3.2%) +9.7% (+6.8%)
Total Profit +33.2% (+6.9%) +7.9%(?)
Profit Remitted to State +20.2% (+14.2%) -0.7%(?)
No. of Enterprises 100 (6000) 417 (5600)
SOURCE: M. Lockett and G. Littler, Trends in Chinese Enterprise
Management, 1978-1982. China's Chan ed Road to Development ed. by
N. Maxwell B. McFarlane, Pergamon Press, 1984, P64
NOTE: Figures in brackets are for enterprises not in the experi-
ment, except* which denotes all enterprises.
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TABLE 4
CENTRAL AND LOCAL FIXED INVESTMENT 1977-198
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Capital Construction 38.2 50.1 52.3 55.9 44.1 55.6
Central (31.2) (41.7) (41.3) (34.9) (25.5) (27.7)
Local (7.0) (8.4) (11.0) (20.9) (19.2) (27.9)
Replacement and
Reconstruction (RR) 16.6 16.8 17.6 18.7 22.5 29.0
Central (1.8) (2.6) (4.4) (3.3) (3.5) (3.3)
Local (14.7) (14.1) (13.2) (15.4) (18.9) (25.7)
Total Fixed Investment 54.8 66.9 69.19 74.6 66.8 84.6
Central (33.0) (44.4) (45.7) (38.2) (28.7) (31.0)
Local (21.8) (22.5) (24.2) (36.4) (38.1) (53.6)
Percentage of Total
Fixed Investment
Under Local Control 40 34 35 49 58 63
SOURCE: Barry Nanghton, False Starts and Second Wind: Financial
Reforms in China's Industrial System- The Political Economy of Reform
in Post-Mao China E. Perry and C. Wong (ede, Harvard Contemporary
China Studies, 1985, p229.
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TABLE 5
TOTAL INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, 1976-83( 100 million)
Investment in C anital Construction Extra-budgetary
State Budget Investment as
Investment as Percentage of
Of which: StateSub- Percentage of Total invest-
Year Total Total Budget Investiment Total Investment ment
1976 1783523.94 376.44 310.93
82 181 977 548.30 382.37 312.35
417.37 1783668.721978 500.99





SOURCE: Peter N. S. Lee, Enterprise Autonomy Policy in Post-Mao China,
The China Quarterly, Vol. 105 (June 1986), p.64.
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TABLE 6
INVESTMENT IN CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION (Y billion)
Increase over State budgetary Increase over Extra-budgetary Increase over
Tear Total Previous year investment previous year investment previous year
7.031.21977 38.2
8.641.7 +23%1978 +34%+31%50.1
10.541.9 +0.5% +22%979 52.3
-17% +200%+7% 21.034.91980 55.9
-9%-28%-21% 19.11981 44.3 25.2
+46%+10% 27.9+26% 27.755.60982
SOURCE: Hsin Chang, The 1982-82 Over-investment Crisis in China. Asian Survey
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北 京 大 学 学 报 ， 一 九 八 二 年 第 二 期 ， 页 十 一
至 十 九 。
23
柯 庆 施 ， 《 论 （ 全 国 一 盘 棋 ） 》 ， 红 旗 ， 一 九
至 九 年 第 二 期 ， 页 九 至 十 二 。
24
曹 思 原 ， 《 增 强 企 业 活 力 的 法 律 措 施 - - - 关
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于 制 定 財 〈 企 业 破 产 整 顿 法 〉 的 建 议 》 ， 民 主
与 法 制 ， 一 九 八 四 年 第 十 一 期 ， 页 七 至 十 一
25.
曹 思 源 ， 《 试 论 表 期 亏 损 企 业 的 破 產 处 理 问
题 ） ， 瞭 望 ， 一 九 八 四 年 第 九 期 ， 页 十 八 至
十 九 。
26. 曹 车 卿 等 ， 《 上 海 財 政 体 制 改 革 初 探 》 ， 复
旦 学 报 ， 一 九 八 二 年 第 一 期 ， 页 二 十 一 至 二
十 四
27. 《 进 一 步 发 展 横 向 经 济 ， 国 务 院 规 定 共 廿 十 条 》
仅 报 ， 一 九 八 六 年 三 月 二 十 四 日 ， 页 八 。
28. 蔡 明 钦 ， 《 中 共 国 營 企 业 实 行 利 政 税 初 探 》
中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 三 年 六 月 十 五 日 ， 第 六 期
， 頁 六 十 八 至 七 十 六 。
29. 蔡 明 钦 ， 《 一 九 八 三 年 的 中 共 財 政 工 作 》 ,
中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 四 年 二 月 十 五 日 ， 第 二 期
， 頁 三 十 六 至 五 十 一 。
30. 蔡 明 钦 ， 《 中 共 国 營 企 业 实 施 利 政 税 剖 析 》
中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 四 年 七 月 十 五 日 ， 第 七 期
， 頁 六 十 至 六 十 七 。
31. 蔡 明 钦 ， 《 对 王 丙 乾 一 九 八 二 年 財 政 决 算 报
告 的 分 析 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 五 年 七 月 十
89
五 日 ， 第 七 期 ， 页 六 十 四 至 七 十 三 。
32. 薛 暮 桥 ， 《 关 于 经 济 体 制 改 革 理 论 需 要 继 续
深 入 讨 论 几 个 问 题 》 ， 新 华 月 报 ， 一 九 八 三
年 第 二 期 ， 页 六 十 三 至 六 十 七 。
33. 钱 元 亨 ， 《 对 中 共 一 九 八 二 年 财 政 预 算 报 告
的 分 析 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 二 年 七 月 十 五
日 ， 第 七 期 ， 页 六 十 二 至 七 十 三 。
34. 钱 元 亨 ， 《 对 中 共 在 工 交 企 业 推 行 经 济 责 任
制 问 题 的 剖 析 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 二 年 四
月 十 五 日 ， 第 四 期 ， 页 七 十 八 至 八 十 四 。
35. 钱 元 亨 ， 《 对 中 共 一 九 八 一 年 国 家 决 算 报 告
的 分 析 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 二 年 十 月 十 五
日 ， 第 十 期 ， 页 一 二 二 至 一 三 二 。
36.
钱 元 亨 ， 《 对 中 共 一 九 八 二 年 国 民 经 济 计 划
及 财 政 预 算 草 案 的 分 析 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九
八 三 年 一 月 十 五 日 ， 第 一 期 ， 页 八 十 三 至 九
十 五 。
37.
钱 元 亨 ， 《 对 中 共 工 业 管 理 体 制 改 革 近 况 的
研 究 》 ， 中 共 研 究 ， 一 九 八 三 年 五 月 十 五 日 ，
第 五 期 ， 页 六 十 三 至 七 十 一 。
38.
魏 礼 群 ， 《 论 实 施 指 导 性 计 划 的 几 个 问 题 》 ，
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经 济 理 论 当 经 济 管 理 ， 一 九 八 五 年 第 三 期 ，
頁 二 十 至 二 十 六 。
B. Books:
1. 中 国 財 政 学 会 编 ， 第 六 次 全 国 財 政 理 论 讨 论
会 文 选 ， 中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 三 。
2. 中 国 財 政 学 会 编 ， 第 五 次 全 国 財 政 理 论 讨 论
会 文 选 ， 中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 二 。
3. 中 国 財 政 学 会 编 ， 第 四 次 全 国 財 政 理 论 讨 论
会 文 选 ， 中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 一 。
4. 中 国 財 政 与 金 融 编 写 组 ， 中 国 財 政 与 金 融 ，
北 京 大 学 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 五 。
5. 中 国 財 政 学 会 编 ， 一 九 八 二 年 財 政 理 论 文 选
中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 三 。
6. 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 財 政 部 办 公 厅 编 ， 一 九 八 三
年 財 政 规 章 制 度 选 编 （ 下 ) ， 中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版
社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
7. 王 绍 飞 ， 财 政 学 新 论 ， 中 国 財 政 经 济 出 版 社
一 九 八 四 。
8. 邓 子 基 ， 社 会 主 义 財 政 理 论 若 干 问 题 ， 中 国
財 政 经 济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
9. 关 蔓 觉 ， 陈 云 同 志 的 经 济 思 想 ， 上 海 知 识 出
版 社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
10. 麦 履 康 等 编 ， 国 家 预 算 ， 中 央 广 播 电 视 大 学
出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
11. 陈 共 等 ， 财 政 堂 教 程 ， 中 国 财 政 经 济 出 版 社 ，
一 矣 八 五 。
12. 周 伯 棣 ， 中 国 财 政 史 ， 上 海 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一
九 八 一 。
13. 周 伯 棣 ， 中 国 财 政 思 想 史 稿 ， 福 建 人 民 出 版
社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
14 金 仁 雄 等 ， 利 改 税 简 稿 ， 中 国 财 政 经 济 出 版
社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
15. 段 云 ， 财 政 金 融 论 探 ， 中 国 财 政 经 济 出 版 社 ，
一 九 八 四 。
16 顾 宗 校 ， 全 民 所 有 制 企 业 身 负 盈 亏 研 究 ， 四
川 省 社 会 科 学 院 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
17.
财 政 工 作 三 十 五 年 ， 中 国 财 政 经 济 出 版 社 ，
一 九 八 四 。
18. 黄 达 等 ， 社 会 主 义 财 政 金 融 问 题 （ 上 ） （ 下 ） ， 中 国
人 民 大 学 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 一 。
19 许 毅 等 ， 中 国 的 财 政
1977-1980 人 民 出 版
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社 ， 一 九 八 二 。
20 许 毅 ， 许 毅 论 文 集 ， 陈 文 鸿 编 ， 时 光 图 书 公
司 ， 一 九 八 四 。
21 厦 门 大 学 经 济 系 財 政 金 融 教 研 室 ， 社 会 主 义
財 政 理 论 ， 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 七 八 。
22 裴 元 秀 等 ， 陈 云 財 政 论 著 浅 谈 ， 新 华 出 版 社
一 九 八 四 。
C. Documents:
1. 中 共 中 央 关 于 经 济 体 制 改 革 的 决 定 ， 香 港 三
联 书 店 ， 一 九 八 四 。
2. 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 个 人 所 得 说 法 ， 中 国 財 政 经
济 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 一 。
3. 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 第 六 届 全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 第
三 次 会 议 文 件 汇 编 ， 全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 常 务
委 員 会 办 公 厅 编 ， 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 五 。
4. 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 第 六 届 全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 第
二 次 会 议 文 件 汇 编 ， 全 车 人 民 代 表 大 会 常 务
委 员 会 办 公 厅 编 ， 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 四 。
5. 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 第 六 届 人 民 代 表 大 会 第
一 次 会 议 文 件 汇 编 ， 全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 常 务
委 員 會 辦 公 廳 編 ， 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 三 。
6. 中 國 共 產 黨 十 二 屆 的 中 全 會 全 國 代 表 會 議 十
二 屆 五 中 全 會 文 件 江 編 ， 人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 五 。
7. 國 務 院 公 報 。
8. 胡 耀 邦 ， 在 慶 祝 中 國 共 產 黨 成 立 六 十 周 年 大
會 上 的 講 話 ， 香 港 三 聯 書 店 ， 一 九 八 一 。
9.
趙 紫 陽 ， 關 于 第 六 個 五 年 計 劃 的 報 告 ， 人 民
出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 二 。
10 趙 紫 陽 ， 在 第 六 屆 全 國 人 民 代 表 大 會 年 二 次
會 議 上 政 府 工 作 報 告 ， 香 港 三 聯 書 店 ， 一 九
八 四 。
11.
趙 紫 陽 ， 當 前 的 經 濟 行 勢 和 經 濟 體 制 改 革 ，
人 民 出 版 社 ， 一 九 八 五 。
D. newspapers and Periodicals Published in the PRC (frequently
consulted)
(a) Newspapers:
1. 大 公 報 (Dagong Bao)
2.
光 明 日 報 (Guang Ming Ri Bao)
3. 經 濟 日 報 (Jing Ji Ri Bao)
4. 人 民 日 報
(Renmin Ri Bao)
5 新 華 日 報
(b) periodicals
1. 北 京 週 報
2. 經 濟 科 學
3. 財 經 問 題 研 究
4. 財 經 研 究
5. 財 貿 經 濟
6. 財 務 與 會 計
7. 財 政
8. 財 政 金 融
9. 財 政 研 究
10. 民 主 與 法 制
11. 紅 旗
12. 經 濟 管 理
13. 經 濟 體 制 改 革
14. 經 濟 與 管 理 研 究
15. 經 濟 問 題 探 討
16. 瞭 冷
17. 新 華 月 報
18.
中 國 稅 務
(Xin Hua Ri Bao)
(Beijing Review)
(Cai Jing Ke Xue)
(Cai Jing Wenti Yanjiu)
(Cai Jing Yanjiu)
(Cai Mao Jing Ji)




(Democracy & Legal System)
(Hongqi)
(Jing Ji Guanli)
(Jing Ji Ti Zhi Gai Ge)
(Jing Ji Yu GuanLi Yanjiu)
(Jingji Wenti Tansuo)
(Outlook Weekly)
(Xin Hua Yue Bao)
(Zhong Gua Shui Wu)


